Nomadic: Normalising maliciously-secure distance with cosine similarity for two-party biometric authentication

Cheng, Nan; Önen, Melek; Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini; Chouchane, Oubaida; Todisco, Massimiliano; Ibarrondo, Alberto

Computing the distance between two non-normalized vectors x and y, represented by Δ (xy) and comparing it to a predefined public threshold τ is an essential functionality used in privacy-sensitive applications such as biometric authentication, identification, machine learning algorithms (e.g., linear regression, k-nearest neighbors, etc.), and typo-tolerant password-based authentication. Tackling a widely used distance metric, Nomadic studies the privacy-preserving evaluation of cosine similarity in a two-party (2PC) distributed setting. We illustrate this setting in a scenario where a client uses biometrics to authenticate to a service provider, outsourcing the distance calculation to two computing servers. In this setting, we propose two novel 2PC protocols to evaluate the normalising cosine similarity between non-normalised two vectors followed by comparison to a public threshold, one in the semi-honest and one in the malicious setting. Our protocols combine additive secret sharing with function secret sharing, saving one communication round by employing a new building block to compute the composition of a function f yielding a binary result with a subsequent binary gate. Overall, our protocols outperform all prior works, requiring only two communication rounds under a strong threat model that also deals with malicious inputs via normalisation. We evaluate our protocols in the setting of biometric authentication using voice, and the obtained results reveal a notable efficiency improvement compared to existing state-of-the-art works.


DOI
Type:
Conférence
City:
Singapore
Date:
2024-07-01
Department:
Sécurité numérique
Eurecom Ref:
7678
Copyright:
© ACM, 2024. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in https://doi.org/10.1145/3634737.3657022

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/7678