AttackDefense framework (ADF): Enhancing IoT devices and lifecycles threat modeling

Sacchetti, Tommaso; Bognar, Marton; De Meulemeester, Jesse; Gierlichs, Benedikt; Piessens, Frank; Bezsmertnyi, Volodymyr; Molteni, Maria Chiara; Cristalli, Stefano; Gringiani, Arianna; Thomas, Olivier; Antonioli, Daniele
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2024

Threat modeling (TM) is essential to manage, prevent, and fix security and privacy issues in our society. TM requires a data model to represent threats and tools to exploit such data. Current TM data models and tools have significant limitations preventing their usage in real-world scenarios. For example, it is challenging to TM embedded devices with current data models and tools as they cannot model their hardware, firmware, and low-level software. Moreover, it is impossible to TM a device lifecycle or security-privacy tradeoffs as these data models and tools were developed for other use cases (e.g., software security or user privacy).
We fill this relevant gap by presenting the AttackDefense Framework (ADF), which provides a novel data model and related tools to augment TM. ADF’s building block is the AD object that can be used to represent heterogeneous and complex threats. Moreover, ADF provides automations to process a collection of AD objects, including ways to create sets, maps, chains, trees, and wordclouds of AD objects. We present ADF, a toolkit implementing ADF composed of four modules (Catalog, Parse, Check, and Analyze).
We confirm that the data model and tools provided by ADF are useful by running an extensive set of experiments while threat modeling a crypto wallet and its lifecycle. Our experiments involved seven expert groups from academia and industry, each using the ADF on an orthogonal threat class. The evaluation generated 175 high-quality ADs covering ISA/IEC 62433-4-1 SecDev Lifecycle, side-channels, fault injection, microarchitectural attacks, speculative execution, pre-silicon testing, invasive physical chip modifications, Bluetooth protocol and implementation threats, and FIDO2 authentication.

DOI
Type:
Journal
Date:
2024-10-08
Department:
Sécurité numérique
Eurecom Ref:
7900
Copyright:
© ACM, 2024. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2024 https://doi.org/10.1145/3698396

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/7900