Honeypots : practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions

Pouget, Fabien; Dacier, Marc; Debar, Hervé
PRDC 2004, 10th International symposium Pacific Rim Dependable Computing, March 3-5, 2004, Tahiti, French Polynesia

In this paper, we report on an experiment run with several honeypots for 4 months. The motivation of this work resides in our wish to use data collected by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems. This work in progress establishes the foundations for a feasibility study into that direction. After a review of the state of the art with respect to honeypots, we present our test bed, discuss results obtained and lessons learned Avenues for future work are also proposed.


DOI
Type:
Conference
City:
Tahiti
Date:
2004-03-03
Department:
Digital Security
Eurecom Ref:
1416
Copyright:
© 2004 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
See also:

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1416