Nomadic: Normalising maliciously-secure distance with cosine similarity for two-party biometric authentication

Cheng, Nan; Önen, Melek; Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini; Chouchane, Oubaida; Todisco, Massimiliano; Ibarrondo, Alberto
ASIACCS 2024, 19th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 1-5 July 2024, Singapore, Singapore

Computing the distance between two non-normalized vectors x and y, represented by Δ (xy) and comparing it to a predefined public threshold τ is an essential functionality used in privacy-sensitive applications such as biometric authentication, identification, machine learning algorithms (e.g., linear regression, k-nearest neighbors, etc.), and typo-tolerant password-based authentication. Tackling a widely used distance metric, Nomadic studies the privacy-preserving evaluation of cosine similarity in a two-party (2PC) distributed setting. We illustrate this setting in a scenario where a client uses biometrics to authenticate to a service provider, outsourcing the distance calculation to two computing servers. In this setting, we propose two novel 2PC protocols to evaluate the normalising cosine similarity between non-normalised two vectors followed by comparison to a public threshold, one in the semi-honest and one in the malicious setting. Our protocols combine additive secret sharing with function secret sharing, saving one communication round by employing a new building block to compute the composition of a function f yielding a binary result with a subsequent binary gate. Overall, our protocols outperform all prior works, requiring only two communication rounds under a strong threat model that also deals with malicious inputs via normalisation. We evaluate our protocols in the setting of biometric authentication using voice, and the obtained results reveal a notable efficiency improvement compared to existing state-of-the-art works.


DOI
Type:
Conference
City:
Singapore
Date:
2024-07-01
Department:
Digital Security
Eurecom Ref:
7678
Copyright:
© ACM, 2024. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ASIACCS 2024, 19th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 1-5 July 2024, Singapore, Singapore https://doi.org/10.1145/3634737.3657022

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/7678